

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250, which are destined for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Provisions is doing its utmost to get these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the present situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite.

I may say that the State Department still nerves about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway.

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better material.

I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given way in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waciche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.

I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little reminiscence if I don't drop you a line.

Harry Yarnall is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. My little brood are all well.

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. Hart, USN.

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,

USS "HOUSTON".

% Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

EXHIBIT No. 72

[SECRET]

In reply refer to Initials and No.  
OP-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, 2 August 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good summary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.

Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "thinking out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are coming along, etc., etc.

We have no one at the front in the Russian-German war though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the press, therefore,

you have about as much information as we have. There is no doubt that the Germans are behind schedule and there is no doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next month or six weeks should clarify the picture.

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occasionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly, having gotten the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it worth while.

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,

*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,  
USS "Pennsylvania,"  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

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[SECRET]

Op-10 Hu

31 JULY 1941.

DEAR SAVVY: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will continue to write;—it seems like old times.

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after showing it to Kimmel.

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have.

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc, etc, etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture.

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one and hence our consideration.

As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation necessary.



Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 26 PBVs and 11 modern submarines.

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away.

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every auxiliary ship I get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go around. If we cannot properly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly slowed up in the Atlantic.

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure from there is another thing I have to contend with.

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc. etc. Thank the good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking anything away from the Navy.

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world shipping situation is plain rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and whatnot, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows whatnot. Marshall's troubles in this respect are legion and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc. etc.

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to hear me mention the subject.

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet standpoint and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is something that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work on Lend-lease.

I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBV repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the

training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that." Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. Some generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly not less easy.

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know.

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe the people would follow the President in any positive action—such as escort—which he might take.

We shall give aid to Russia. I hope she and Germany may break upon each other. Europe dominated by the Communists is no more an attractive picture, and in fact less so, than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. Here's hoping we have neither, but rather that they both exhaust themselves. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having much more difficulty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost will be crippling. Only time will tell.

I have urged propaganda whenever we could use it, particularly in South America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of independence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that the Germans could have cleared up in the Near East had they gone in that direction instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in the Near East area.

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you think there is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let this partly serve.

Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please be charitable as to its lack of continuity, etc. etc.

With all good wishes—and good luck.

Sincerely,

Captain CHARLES M. COOKE, Jr., USN,  
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling.

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

Keep cheerful.



One more P. S.—I am sending Kimmel the copy of this letter. When I got to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to whom I am also sending a copy.

H. R. S.

[NOTE.—The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 72, which is a personal letter dated 2 August 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, enclosing a copy of a letter to Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., U. S. N. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The second, third and fourth sentences in the fifth paragraph on page 4 of the enclosure to Captain Cooke.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 11, which the Judge Advocate proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.]

#### EXHIBIT No. 73

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, April 3, 1941.

In reply refer to initials  
and No.

Serial 689012.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Observations on the present international situation.

1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your second in command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.

2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressed by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate.

3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval development gives adequate security in case the British Isles